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Chun-Hung Chiu, Tsan-Ming Choi, Xun Li
Automatica, Volume 47, Issue 8, August 2011
Abstract
Target sales rebate (TSR) contracts have been shown to be useful in coordinating supply chains with risk-neutral agents. However, there have been few studies on the cases with risk sensitive agents. As a result, based on the classic Markowitz portfolio theory in finance, we carry out in this paper a mean–variance (MV) analysis of supply chains under TSR contracts. We study a supply chain with a single supplier and a single risk averse retailer. We propose TSR contracts for achieving coordination. We demonstrate how TSR contracts can coordinate the supply chain which takes into consideration the degree of risk aversion of the retailer. We find that the supplier can coordinate the channel with flexible TSR contracts. In addition, we extend the supply chain model to include sales effort decision of the retailer. Conditions for TSR contracts to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort of retailer are also derived.
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